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state schooling in 19th century as a natural experiment to obtain exogenous variation in 
current private-school shares. Our instrumental-variable results suggest that a 10 percentage-
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1. Introduction 
Research on the effects of competition in the school system has mostly focused on the 
cognitive skills of students, as measured by standardized tests in subjects such as mathematics, 
reading, and science. While cognitive skills are important for individual and national economic 
outcomes (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008), other skills beyond the cognitive kind are generally 
viewed as additional important outcomes of schooling. In particular, recent thinking on the 
determinants of economic growth stresses the importance of innovation and creative destruction 
in a Schumpeterian spirit (e.g., Aghion and Howitt 2009; Audretsch 2007; Baumol 2002; 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991), which places the focus on entrepreneurship.
1 In line with 
this, policymakers around the world are increasingly wondering whether entrepreneurial traits 
can be nurtured in the education system (see Oosterbeek, van Praag, and Ijsselstein 2010 for 
references). There is clearly substantial variation across countries: Our data suggest that the share 
of 15-year-old students expressing entrepreneurial intentions varies from less than 1 percent in 
Denmark, Japan, Germany, and Portugal to more than 7 percent in the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands, and other work has shown that students’ intentions are strongly linked to later 
actually becoming an entrepreneur. Why do countries differ so strongly in the entrepreneurial 
spirits of their students? Is it solely innate traits and family environments, or are entrepreneurial 
spirits amenable to school policy? Recent evidence suggests that explicit entrepreneurship 
education programs seem to have failed in raising entrepreneurial intentions (Oosterbeek, van 
Praag, and Ijsselstein 2010).  
To study whether school systems can affect entrepreneurial traits, in this paper, we estimate 
the effect of competition from privately operated schools on the entrepreneurial intentions of 
students. By affecting how schools are run, private-school competition might be an institutional 
feature of the school system that creates a general school climate supportive of entrepreneurial 
spirit. Our use of international variation exploits long-standing differences in school competition, 
allowing us to identify long-term general-equilibrium effects of competition, which are the focus 
of most economic arguments for school competition but usually escape studies evaluating small-
                                                 
1 See van Praag and Versloot (2007) for an encompassing review of the empirical literature showing that 
entrepreneurship has important effects on employment creation, innovation, and productivity growth and creates 
spillovers beyond the own firm.   2
scale programs. To avoid problems from students not being randomly assigned to schools within 
a system but sorting themselves into public and private schools in ways that may be correlated 
with their entrepreneurial disposition, we measure private competition as the aggregate share of 
privately operated schools in a country (while using outcomes and control variables at the 
individual student level in microeconometric regressions).  
The simple cross-country association between private-school shares and students’ 
entrepreneurial intentions may, however, still be subject to different forms of endogeneity bias. 
Most importantly, there may be a higher tendency to set up private schools in more 
entrepreneurial regions. More generally, other omitted factors related to the demand or supply 
side of the school system may also be correlated with both private schooling and students’ 
entrepreneurial intentions. To address such endogeneity issues, we exploit the fact that resistance 
of the Catholic Church to state schooling in the 19
th century has repercussions for the size of the 
private school sector to these days. Following West and Woessmann (2010), we use this 
historical source of variation as a natural experiment to identify exogenous variation in private 
school competition. Our instrumental-variable specification uses the share of Catholics in 1900 – 
interacted with an indicator for Catholicism not being the state religion, as Catholics had no need 
to opt out of the state school system if the Church could control it – as an instrument for current 
private-school shares. Because identification in this setting comes from long-term variation in 
school competition and current students’ parents may already have been exposed to the system 
and transmitted entrepreneurial intentions to their children, our estimations control for whether 
the students’ parents, as well as the parents of the students’ peers, have entrepreneurial 
occupations. In addition, we can control for individual students’ cognitive skills in mathematics 
and science. Given the historical nature of our instrument, we go further to control for the current 
share of Catholics in a country. In fact, the current share of Catholics is negatively associated 
with students’ entrepreneurial intentions in our second-stage equation, suggesting that our results 
are not driven by a direct effect of religion on entrepreneurship.  
Our cross-country student-level analyses suggest that private-school competition has a 
positive causal effect on the entrepreneurial intentions of students. Larger historical Catholic 
shares that translate into a 10 percentage point larger private school sector today increase the 
share of students with entrepreneurial intentions by 0.3-0.5 percentage points. This is a 
quantitatively substantial effect, viewed against the international mean of 2.8 percent of students   3
indicating entrepreneurial intentions. Additional analyses suggest that this is mostly an effect of 
increased competition in the system, rather than of a mere advantage of private operation, as 
public-school students in countries with larger private-sector competition profit as much as their 
private-school compatriots. The results show that school competition may indeed have effects 
beyond traditional measures of academic achievement, on relevant non-academic outcomes.  
Several mechanisms may lie behind this effect. Traditional economic arguments stress that 
competition from privately operated schools has positive general-equilibrium effects on the 
outcomes of the system because it creates incentives to enact quality-enhancing innovations and 
to contain cost within the public sector (Friedman 1962). This may lead to better outcomes not 
only in the academic sphere, but also in terms of non-academic measures such as entrepreneurial 
traits. Critics of this view argue, though, that greater private schooling may lead to more 
segregation rather than better outcomes (e.g., Ladd 2002). School competition may also create a 
more business-like and entrepreneurial environment in (private as well as public) schools as 
administrators and teachers have to face competition from other providers, which may affect 
students’ entrepreneurial traits (cf. Sobel and King 2008). Finally, school competition might 
force school administrators to be innovative in the supply of courses, teaching methods, and 
extra-curricular activities that complement students’ qualifications beyond the baseline 
curriculum, so that students leave school with a more balanced portfolio of cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. Recent theory suggests that such a ‘jack-of-all-trades’ combination of skills 
might be particularly supportive of entrepreneurship (Lazear 2004). We provide indicative 
evidence in favor of these mechanisms.  
The database that allows us to assess the impact of school competition on students’ 
entrepreneurial intentions is the 2006 cycle of the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD 2007). PISA is a representative study of 15-year-olds enrolled in school 
whose main objective is to assess the mathematical, scientific, and reading literacy of the student 
population. But additionally, students are asked to report the kind of job they intend to have 
when they are about 30 years old. From this, we derive an indicator which codes whether they 
wish to own or to manage a small business, a well-accepted proxy for entrepreneurship (cf. 
Parker 2010). While this is an indicator of students’ entrepreneurial intentions rather actual 
occupational choices, evidence from the longitudinal British Cohort Study (BCS) shows that the   4
entrepreneurial intentions reported at age 16 are a good predictor for actual future entrepreneurial 
occupations (Falck, Heblich, and Luedemann 2009).
2  
Our research relates to two strands of recent literature in particular. The first strand explores 
whether entrepreneurial outcomes can be affected by the education system. Most closely related 
to our paper, Sobel and King (2008) show that, in a cross-section of U.S. counties, counties that 
have a voucher program also have higher youth entrepreneurship rates. While revealing an 
important relationship, it is not clear to what extent this association depicts the causal effect of 
school choice. In a paper focused on the identification of exogenous variation, Oosterbeek, van 
Praag, and IJsselstein (2010) find no effects of an entrepreneurship education program on 
entrepreneurial intentions of vocational college students in the Netherlands. Von Graevenitz, 
Harhoff, and Weber (2010) find similar evidence for Germany (see also their additional 
references for related studies). Using cross-country data, Falck, Heblich, and Luedemann (2009) 
find evidence that students’ entrepreneurial intentions are related to the entrepreneurial 
background of their peers’ parents. These factors complement other determinants of 
entrepreneurship stemming from socialization outside the formal education system, such as the 
role of parents’ occupation, gender role models, and ethnicity (see Parker 2009 for a review) and 
innate biological characteristics (e.g., Nicolaou et al. 2008).  
A second strand of related literature analyzes the effects of school choice and competition 
more generally.
3 In the last decades, a large of body of literature in the fields of economics, 
sociology, and political science has discussed the potential costs and benefits arising from school 
competition (e.g., Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore 1982; Hoxby 2003; Chakrabarti and Peterson 
2009), nearly exclusively concentrating on cognitive skills, measured by student achievement 
scores, as outcomes. Several studies that try to estimate effects of private schools in the United 
States have made use of variation stemming from contemporary variation in Catholic shares 
(e.g., Hoxby 1994; Evans and Schwab 1995; Sander 1996; Neal 1997; Dee 1998; Jepsen 2002; 
Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005; among others), and one from historical Catholic shares (Cohen-
Zada 2009). In a setup similar to our study, West and Woessmann (2010) estimate the effect of 
                                                 
2 Similarly, reviewing the psychological and management literature on entrepreneurship as intentional 
behavior, von Graevenitz, Harhoff, and Weber (2010) conclude that intentions can explain a substantial part of 
actual variation in entrepreneurial behavior. 
3 Because the general literature on educational production has found little evidence of resource effects (e.g., 
Woessmann and West 2006), attention has increasingly shifted to effects of institutions of the school system such as 
choice and competition, accountability, and incentive systems.   5
private-school competition on students’ academic achievement in mathematics, reading, and 
science using PISA-2003 data. Despite the increasing awareness of the role of non-cognitive, in 
addition to cognitive, skills in general (cf. Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne 2001; Heckman, Stixrud, 
and Urzua 2006), only few studies have looked at effects of school competition beyond academic 
skills so far. Peterson and Viarengo (2009) show that attending the Catholic private school sector 
is positively related to a number of non-cognitive outcomes such as engagement, attentiveness, 
tardiness, and absenteeism in the United States. Looking at school choice in the form of open 
enrollment in public schools in Chicago, Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) find little evidence for 
improvements on traditional academic measures, but positive evidence for improvements on self-
reported disciplinary incidents and arrest rates. We are not aware of any evidence on the causal 
effect of school competition on entrepreneurial traits of students so far.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the PISA dataset as 
source for measuring students’ entrepreneurial intentions. Section 3 sets out our estimation 
strategy. Section 4 reports our results on the effect of private school competition on students’ 
entrepreneurial intentions, along with some indicative analyses of possible underlying 
mechanisms and several robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  International Micro Data on Students’ Entrepreneurial Intentions  
2.1 Students’  Entrepreneurial  Intentions  in the PISA-2006 Student Achievement Database 
We use student-level data from the 2006 cycle of the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), which was conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD 2007). The main objective of PISA is to assess the mathematical, 
scientific, and reading literacy of the student population in each participating country. In addition 
to the performance tests, students provide detailed information on their personal characteristics 
and family backgrounds. Moreover, school principals report details on their schools’ resource 
endowments and institutional settings. In each participating country, PISA draws a representative 
sample of the 15-year-olds enrolled in school. Thus, in most of the countries assessed, the target 
population comprises young people near the end of their compulsory schooling.  
Our dataset contains 192,118 students from 27 countries (see Table 1 for a list of countries). 
The country sample comprises all OECD member countries, with three exceptions: France, 

























Austria 0.014  0.076  0.095  -  0.916  0.755  1 
Belgium  0.032  0.093 0.688 0.851  0.974 0.809  0 
Canada  0.014  0.119 0.075 0.538  0.399 0.391  0 
Czech  Republic  0.077  0.214 0.070 0.634  0.862 0.404  0 
Denmark  0.007  0.023 0.242 0.756  0.002 0.006  0 
Finland  0.017  0.043 0.030 0.977  0.000 0.001  0 
Germany  0.009  0.041 0.058 0.782  0.357 0.335  0 
Greece  0.017  0.197 0.058 0.000  0.013 0.004  0 
Hungary  0.014  0.045 0.168 0.779  0.606 0.609  0 
Iceland  0.011  0.093 0.010 0.448  0.000 0.010  0 
Ireland  0.033  0.138 0.620 0.897  0.887 0.847  0 
Italy  0.041  0.167 0.039 0.135  0.996 0.798  1 
Japan  0.007  0.071 0.316 0.327  0.001 0.004  0 
Luxembourg  0.023  0.088 0.148 0.885  0.966 0.902  1 
Mexico  0.012  0.044 0.165 0.008  0.908 0.900  0 
Netherlands  0.074  0.128 0.676 0.956  0.351 0.345  0 
New  Zealand 0.050  0.177 0.059 0.149  0.135 0.128  0 
Norway  0.020  0.115 0.022 0.883  0.001 0.010  0 
Poland  0.016  0.107 0.016 0.353  0.771 0.922  0 
Portugal  0.002  0.023 0.101 0.643  0.998 0.887  1 
Slovakia  0.063  0.064 0.075 0.935  0.847 0.679  0 
South  Korea  0.036  0.292 0.464 0.552  0.005 0.069  0 
Spain  0.017  0.071 0.371 0.670  1.000 0.917  1 
Sweden  0.045  0.166 0.083 0.989  0.000 0.019  0 
Turkey  0.027  0.160 0.025 0.000  0.005 0.001  0 
United  Kingdom  0.027  0.131 0.079 0.129  0.064 0.093  0 
United  States 0.028  0.094 0.080 0.020  0.142 0.182  0 
Mean of each variable. Sample: OECD countries (except for Australia, France, and Switzerland due to missing data).    7
  information on the private operation of schools; and Switzerland, which did not provide 
entrepreneurial answers in the intended-occupation data.
4  
Apart from testing academic achievement, most importantly for our analyses the PISA-2006 
survey also questioned students about their occupational intentions, from which we derive a 
measure of students’ entrepreneurial intentions. We draw on students’ responses to the question 
of what kind of job they intend to have when they are about 30 years old. Students were asked to 
write down the job title. The responses were then coded according to the four-digit International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) code by the PISA consortium. The students 
also provided information on their mother’s and father’s occupation, which was again given a 
four-digit ISCO-88 code.  
In the ISCO-88 classification, codes starting with 13xx reflect occupations that are related to 
running small enterprises. The entrepreneurship literature regards these occupational indicators 
as a good proxy for entrepreneurship (cf. Parker 2010). Consequently, for both the students’ 
intended occupations and the parents’ actual occupations, we construct an indicator variable that 
equals unity if the occupation is entrepreneurial and 0 otherwise.
5  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the students’ entrepreneurial intentions and parents’ 
entrepreneurial occupations at the country level. The share of students with entrepreneurial 
intentions varies substantially across countries, from less than 1 percent in Denmark, Japan, 
Germany, and Portugal to more than 7 percent in the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. The 
international mean is 2.8 percent.  
2.2  Additional International Data  
Our main explanatory variable is the share of students attending privately operated schools 
in a country. The PISA survey defines private schools as those managed directly or indirectly by 
a non-government organization. School principals provide information on the private-operation 
status of their school, which we aggregate to the country level. PISA also provides information 
                                                 
4 Due to missing data, Austria drops from specifications that include school funding variables. 
5 Most of the students’ responses were coded in the general category “Small enterprise: general managers” 
(ISCO-88 code 1300). Additional narrower categories, available only for a subset of students, indicate businessmen 
and self-employed managers of small enterprises in different industries, such as manufacturing, merchants, 
communications, business services, and farming. To ensure that our results are not driven by individual sectors, we 
performed robustness tests where we dropped each narrower category from the analysis one at a time. Results are 
fully robust in these regressions.   8
on the share of each school’s funding stemming from government sources, from which we derive 
a measure of the average share of government funding in private schools in a country. Table 1 
reports descriptive statistics of these and other main explanatory variables for each country. The 
share of students attending privately operated schools ranges from less than 4 percent in Finland, 
Iceland, Italy, Norway, Poland, and Turkey to more than 60 percent in Belgium, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands, with an international mean of 17.9 percent.  
The PISA-2006 database provides a rich set of control variables at the student level based on 
extensive background information drawn from the PISA student and school questionnaires. 
Table A1 in the appendix lists the full set of control variables of our models with descriptive 
statistics. They include measures of students’ academic achievement, individual and family 
background variables, indicators of school location, the socio-economic composition of the 
school, students’ learning time, and a set of country-level control variables.
6  
Students’ academic achievement is measured by their scores on the PISA tests in 
mathematics and science. The individual and family background variables include the students’ 
gender, two indicators for students’ immigrant status (first and second generation immigrant, 
with native being the residual category), an index of family wealth constructed by PISA, parents’ 
educational attainment, and an indicator of whether parents’ occupation is entrepreneurial.  
At the school level, control variables include four indicators of the size of the community 
where the school is located. Furthermore, we constructed five indicators of the socio-economic 
composition of the school. These encompass the share of peers with entrepreneurial parents, the 
share of immigrant students, school-average parental education, the school average of an index 
of home possessions, and the school average of the index of family wealth. In addition, we have 
four measures of the learning time in regular lessons provided to the student in four subjects.  
We supplement this rich student- and school-level database from PISA-2006 with additional 
country-level data from several sources. Data on the share of population that was Catholic in 
1900 and 2000 and indicators of countries with state religions in 1900, required for our 
                                                 
6 Like any survey dataset, the PISA dataset contains missing values at the student and school level. Although 
the percentage of missing values is minor for almost any single control variable in our model, deletion of all student 
observations with a missing value on at least one variable would mean a severe reduction in sample size. We thus 
perform a simple data imputation of our questionnaire explanatory variables where we replace missing values of 
continuous variables by the weighted mean at the lowest (school or country) available level and missing values of 
categorical variables by zero. To ensure that our results are not biased by the inclusion of imputed observations, we 
then include missing dummies as well as interaction terms of these dummies with the missing variables in all 
regressions. Observations with missing data on the dependent variable are dropped from the analyses.    9
instrumental-variable model, were obtained from the World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett, 
Kurian, and Johnson 2001). Barro and McCleary (2005) provide indicators of countries with 
Communist regimes in 1970. Additional country-level indicators on contemporary gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, cumulative educational expenditure per student between age 
6 and 15 in 2002, and curriculum-based external exit exams come from several international 
statistical sources (cf. Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz, and West 2009 for details).  
Apart from the set of 27 control variables in our main specification detailed here, we also 
tested a large set of additional control variables at the student and school level. These additional 
control variables turned out not to be statistically significantly related to students’ entrepreneurial 
intentions, individually and jointly, and were consequently dropped from the analysis. These 
additional variables include such measures as language spoken at home, grade indicators, 
student’s grade repetition, school size, gender share at school, and a rich set of measures of 
schools’ institutional characteristics and resource endowment. The latter include measures of 
schools’ admission practices, selectivity, ability grouping, availability of career guidance, 
influence and activities of businesses and industry representatives in the school, accountability 
and autonomy of different forms, and a set of measures of school resources such as average 
student-teacher ratio, an index of teacher shortage, number of computers for instruction per 
student, and a school-level index of the quality of school educational resources.  
3.  The Empirical Model  
3.1 School  Competition  and  Students’ Entrepreneurial Intentions 
To identify the effect of private school competition on a student’s entrepreneurial intention, 
we estimate the following equation:  
  isc isc sc c c isc X X X P OCC ε β β β β β + + + + + = ⋅ 4 3 2 1 0 ) | Pr(  (1) 
where Pr(OCCisc | ·) is the conditional probability of student i in school s in country c intending 
to become an entrepreneur. The country-level variable Pc is the share of students attending 
privately operated schools in country c, our measure of the extent of competition from private 
schools within each national school system. The three vectors of control variables at the country 
(Xc), school (Xsc), and student (Xisc) level contain the 27 control variables discussed above and 
listed in Table A1 in the appendix. They include measures of the student’s academic   10
achievement, individual and family background, school location, school’s socio-economic 
composition and regular learning time, and the country’s GDP per capita and educational 
spending per student, among others.  
Given that the main explanatory variable of interest, the private-school share, is measured at 
the country level, the mean-zero error term εisc is adjusted to allow for clustering of observations 
at the country level in all our regressions (cf. Moulton 1986). While the dependent variable is a 
dummy at the individual level, it is distributed quite evenly at the country level, which provides 
the variation for our identification. Therefore, all models reported in this paper are estimated as 
linear probability models, which are straightforward to interpret. However, probit models yield 
the same results in terms of statistical and quantitative significance.
7 All regressions weight 
students by the inverse of their sampling probabilities within countries (DuMouchel and Duncan 
1983; Wooldridge 2001), with each country given equal aggregate weight.  
Equation (1) depicts a cross-country model that is estimated at the individual student level. 
The student-level estimation allows us to control for the rich background information at the 
student and school level. In contrast to within-country studies that are usually bound to analyze 
limited variation in private-sector competition, however, the cross-country identification allows 
us to exploit much wider and long-established variation between countries with hardly any non-
government school and countries with two thirds of their schools being privately operated. This 
setup is able to capture general-equilibrium effects of private-sector competition.  
The major concern for identification in the context of this cross-country setup is that omitted 
variables of unobserved country features might be correlated with both the extent of private 
schooling and students’ entrepreneurial intentions, introducing bias into ordinary-least-squares 
(OLS) estimates of β1. By measuring private schooling as shares at the country level, any sorting 
of individual students between private and public schools within a country cancels out in our 
analyses, ruling out bias from within-country sorting. But, most obviously, countries that are 
more entrepreneurial in general may not only endow their children with higher entrepreneurial 
intentions, but also be more likely to create private schools. On the other hand, the public school 
systems in more entrepreneurial countries may already be doing a better job at creating 
entrepreneurial skills, creating less pressure to set up private alternatives. More generally, 
                                                 
7 Detailed results are available from the authors on request.    11
omitted variables that could bias the cross-country analysis include any socio-economic, 
political, or institutional factors that are correlated with students’ entrepreneurial intentions and 
at the same time affect the demand or supply for private schooling. Consequently, the direction 
of bias created by endogeneity due to unobserved country heterogeneity is a priori unclear.  
3.2  The Instrumental-Variable Model  
To address such concerns of endogeneity bias and identify the causal effect of private school 
competition on students’ entrepreneurial intentions, we identify cross-country variation in the 
extent of private school competition that results from historical roots in churches’ stances 
regarding state schooling. As suggested by West and Woessmann (2010), the fact that Catholic 
doctrine in the 19
th century strongly resisted state schooling creates a historical “natural” 
experiment that gives rise to differently sized private-school sectors today. In the late 19
th 
century, the Catholic Church objected to the approach to moral instruction embraced by the 
state-provided mass education systems that emerged in most industrializing countries. As late as 
1912, the Catholic Encyclopedia, summarizing official Catholic doctrine, stated that the “State 
monopoly of education has been considered by the Church to be nothing short of a tyrannical 
usurpation” (Herbermann 1912, p. 558).  
This Catholic doctrine spurred efforts by local parishes to establish private schools and to 
lobby governments to adopt policies supporting private schools in many countries (see West and 
Woessmann 2010 for additional references to official Catholic doctrine and for several historical 
examples of substantial private-school sectors emerging as a consequence in countries such as 
Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United States). Such efforts were most successful in 
countries with substantial Catholic shares in the population. As we will show below, Catholic 
population shares in 1900 are significantly associated with shares of privately operated schools 
even in 2006, even after controlling for contemporary differences in Catholic shares. An 
important exception to this rule are countries where Catholicism was the official state religion, 
because there was no need to create private schools in order to comply with Catholic doctrine in 
these countries.  
We implement an instrumental-variable model that exploits these historical patterns to 
isolate current variation in private schooling that we argue is otherwise unrelated to current 
entrepreneurial intentions. Thus, we use the share of Catholics in 1900 in a country, interacted   12
with an indicator that Catholicism was not official state religion in the country, as an instrument 
for the country’s contemporary share of students attending private schools Pc:  
  isc isc sc c c c X X X Cath P ε α α α α α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 1900  (2) 
where Cath1900 measures the share of the population of countries without Catholic state religion 
that was Catholic in 1900. Only that part of the variation in current private-school shares that can 
be attributed to the historical instrument in this first-stage equation is then used to identify the 
effect of private-school shares on students’ entrepreneurial intentions in the second-stage 
equation (1).  
The identifying assumption of this instrumental-variable approach is that the density of 
Catholics in 1900 is not directly related to students’ entrepreneurial intentions today, 
independent of the indirect effect running through school competition. The most immediate 
concern of this identification is that religion may itself be associated with entrepreneurial traits 
(cf. Dana 2010 for an overview). One of the advantages of our use of historical variation in 
Catholic shares is that we can address such concerns by controlling for any effect that 
contemporary differences in Catholic shares might have on students’ entrepreneurial intentions.  
But even without this fix, there is clear indication in the literature that if anything, any direct 
effect of Catholicism on entrepreneurship is likely to bias our analyses against finding beneficial 
effects of school competition. Historical studies have shown a negative association of 
Catholicism with entrepreneurship in several different historical settings (cf. Weber 1904; 
Landes 1949; Minns and Rizov 2005). There is also abundant contemporary evidence 
underscoring that Catholics tend to be less inclined to become entrepreneurs than Protestants (cf. 
Butler and Herring 1991; Crabtree 2008; and Dana 2009 for a review). In fact, in our analyses 
below, we will also find a significant negative association between students’ entrepreneurial 
intentions and contemporary Catholicism.  
More generally, when it comes to the education system, it has been well documented that 
Catholics have traditionally placed less emphasis than Protestants on the value of education in 
general, in particular because Protestants furthered education as a means to facilitate individual 
Bible reading (Rupp 1996; Becker and Woessmann 2009). In 1900, the Catholic population 
share was strongly negatively correlated with literacy rates (r = -0.75; West and Woessmann 
2010). Similarly, there is a strong negative association of Catholic shares with GDP per capita in   13
1900 (r = -0.54). Taken together, this evidence suggests that by using Catholic-induced variation 
in private school competition, if anything our results will be biased against finding positive 
effects on entrepreneurial outcomes.  
Another channel through which our instrument might be correlated with the outcome of 
interest, students’ entrepreneurial intentions, is that it may relate to the extent to which students’ 
parents are entrepreneurs. The instrument’s relevance suggests that the composition of schools in 
a country is highly persistent over time. This implies that school competition might already have 
had an impact on parents’ entrepreneurial intentions. Since a child’s parents are likely to exert a 
seminal influence on the child’s intentions, it seems quite likely that if the parents are 
entrepreneurial, their child will be so, as well (cf. Bandura 1977). The entrepreneurship literature 
provides abundant evidence for the relevance of the intergenerational transmission mechanism 
within families (cf. Aldrich, Renzulli, and Langton 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Hout and 
Rosen 2000; Fairlie and Robb 2007).  
Thus, in order to disentangle the effect of school competition on students’ intentions from 
possible within-family ties, our analyses control for the occupational status of entrepreneurship 
of individual students’ parents. To further rule out that results are driven not by own parents’, but 
by peers’ parents’ entrepreneurial occupations (cf. Falck, Heblich, and Luedemann 2009), we 
also control for the occupational status of the parents of students’ peers. To the extent that 
private school competition has already furthered parents’ entrepreneurial intentions in the past, 
controlling for parents’ entrepreneurship may actually provide a lower-bound estimate of the 
total long-run effect of school competition on entrepreneurial outcomes.  
Apart from a greater reliance on private schooling, the historical prevalence of Catholicism 
could in principle also have had other consequences, no longer correlated with current 
Catholicism, that affect students’ entrepreneurial intentions today. It seems that the most likely 
channels are current GDP per capita or educational spending per student. Consequently, our 
models control for these variables. West and Woessmann (2010) show that other current 
outcomes that might be conceived to be related to historical Catholicism, such as the 
decentralization of school policy decision-making, public social spending, and income 
inequality, are in fact uncorrelated with historical Catholic shares.  
A final possible indirect pathway of effects on entrepreneurial intentions is students’ 
academic achievement. To ensure that our results capture effects beyond cognitive skills and not   14
just effects on traditional academic outcomes, our models control for students’ PISA test scores 
in mathematics and science at the individual level.  
4. Results 
4.1  The Association between Private Schooling and Students’ Entrepreneurial Intentions 
As a point of departure, Table 2 reports results from least-squares estimations of equation 
(1). The share of students in a country who attend privately operated schools is strongly and 
statistically significantly positively associated with students’ entrepreneurial intentions, even 
after controlling for the large set of student, family, school, and country background factors (cf. 
Table A1 in the appendix). In line with the previous literature on the intergenerational 
transmission of entrepreneurship, parents’ entrepreneurial status is also significantly positively 
associated with their children’s intention to become an entrepreneur.  
The estimates in column (2) are hardly affected by including the Catholic share in 2000 as a 
control variable, which enters the model negatively (statistically insignificantly in this 
specification, but significantly in specifications discussed below). The average share of funding 
that private schools receive from government sources, when added to the model as an additional 
country-level control variable in column (3), is also statistically insignificant and does not affect 
the coefficient on the private-school share.  
When the sample is restricted in columns (4)-(6) to countries whose population is 
predominantly Christian, the coefficient on the private-school share increases. All countries in 
this sample have a share of Christians (from different denominations) in 1900 of more than 85 
percent. These specifications do not include Japan (1 percent Christian share), Korea (1 percent), 
and Turkey (22 percent), where historical Catholic shares are unlikely to be relevant for 
contemporary private school enrollment. 
4.2 Instrumental-Variable  Results 
In order to obtain a causal estimate of the effect of private school competition on students’ 
entrepreneurial intentions, we turn to the instrumental-variable model derived in Section 3.2. 
This instrumental-variable approach uses only that part of the contemporary international 
variation in the share of enrollment in privately operated schools that can be attributed to 
Table 2: The Association between Private School Shares and the Entrepreneurial Intentions of Students 
  OECD countries  Predominantly Christian countries 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 














































Government funding in private schools      -0.00004 
(0.002) 
   -0.001 
(0.003) 
Observations (students)  192,118  192,118  188,075  178,112  178,112  174,069 
Clustering units (countries)  27  27  26  24  24  23 
R²  0.019  0.019 0.019 0.021 0.021  0.021 
Dependent variable: student’s intention to become entrepreneur. Least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability. All regressions include 
control variables for student’s academic achievement (2), individual and family background (5), school location (4), socio-economic composition of the school 
(5), learning time (4), and country-level controls (4) as set out in Table A1, imputation dummies, and interaction terms between imputation dummies and the 
variables. Country sample: OECD countries (except for Australia, France, and Switzerland due to missing data). “Government funding in private schools” is 
missing in Austria. “Predominantly Christian countries” refers to countries with a share of adherence to Christian denominations of more than 85 percent in 1900 
(which excludes Japan, Korea, and Turkey). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses. Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 
5 percent, 
* 10 percent.  
Table 3: Instrumental-Variable Estimates of the Effect of Private School Shares on Students’ Entrepreneurial Intentions 
 OECD  countries  Predominantly  Christian  countries 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Second stage results (Dependent variable: student’s intention to become entrepreneur):    
















































Government funding in private schools      -0.010
*** 
(0.003) 
   -0.003 
(0.003) 
First stage results (Dependent variable: private school share):    















































Government funding in private schools      0.215
*** 
(0.005) 
   0.167
*** 
(0.004) 
Observations (students)  192,118  192,118  188,075  178,112  178,112  174,069 
Clustering  units  (countries)  27 27 26 24 24 23 
F-statistic of excluded instrument  75.62  29.21  32.92  89.96  37.63  41.19 
R² (first stage)  0.465  0.527  0.593  0.569  0.655  0.700 
R² (second stage)  0.019  0.018  0.018  0.021  0.021  0.021 
Two-stage least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability. All regressions include control variables for student’s academic achievement 
(2), individual and family background (5), school location (4), socio-economic composition of the school (5), learning time (4), and country-level controls (4) as 
set out in Table A1, imputation dummies, and interaction terms between imputation dummies and the variables. Country sample: OECD countries (except for 
Australia, France, and Switzerland due to missing data). “Government funding in private schools” is missing in Austria. “Predominantly Christian countries” 
refers to countries with a share of adherence to Christian denominations of more than 85 percent in 1900 (which excludes Japan, Korea, and Turkey). “Catholic 
share in 1900 (no state religion)” refers to the share of Catholics in the population in 1900 interacted with an indicator of whether Catholicism was the state 
religion. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses. Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.   17
 historical differences in Catholic population shares of countries where Catholicism was not the 
official state religion. The instrumental-variable results are reported in Table 3.  
The lower panel of the table reports results of the first-stage equation. The estimates confirm 
the relevance of the instrument: The Catholic population share in 1900 in countries where 
Catholicism was not the state religion is significantly associated with the share of students 
enrolled in privately operated schools in 2006. For each 10 percentage points of additional 
Catholic share in the 1900 population, the private-school share in 2006 is 4.9 percentage points 
higher. The high F-statistic of the instrument in the first stage (of 75.6) confirms the strength of 
the instrument. The covariates show a significant positive association between parents’ 
entrepreneurial status and the private-school share.  
Column (2) reveals that the positive association between historical Catholic shares and 
current private-school shares is still strong when we control for the share of Catholics in the 
current population. While the current Catholic share enters significantly in predicting private-
school shares, the effect of the historical Catholic share remains strong and significant. Column 
(3) shows that the private-school share is higher in countries where privately operated schools 
receive a larger average share of their funding from government sources. Still, controlling for 
this effect does not affect the association between historical Catholic shares and current private-
school shares.  
The second-stage results are reported in the upper panel of Table 3. The results show a 
statistically and quantitatively significant positive effect of the private-school share on students’ 
intentions to become entrepreneurs. In the instrumental-variable model, this effect is solely 
identified from variation that can be related back to differences in Catholic population shares in 
1900. The point estimate increases significantly when the share of Catholics in the current 
population is controlled for in column (2), suggesting that the column (1) specification is 
negatively biased because historical Catholic shares capture a negative direct association 
between Catholic adherence and entrepreneurial intentions. The full results of all control 
variables in the column (3) model are reported in Table A1 in the appendix.  
Our estimates suggest that a 10 percentage-point increase in the share of national enrollment 
in private schools attributable to a historically larger share of Catholics increases the likelihood 
of a student having entrepreneurial intentions by 0.3 percentage points in the specification of 
column (1), and by 0.6 percentage points once the current Catholic share is controlled for. Given   18
that the average share of students with entrepreneurial intentions is 2.8 percent across all OECD 
countries (cf. Table 1), the effect attributable to private competition in the school system is quite 
sizable.  
The instrumental-variable estimates of Table 3 are higher than the OLS estimates of Table 2. 
The difference is statistically significant for the specifications reported in columns (2) and (3). 
This suggests an overall downward bias in the OLS estimates of the effects of private-sector 
competition in the school system on students’ entrepreneurial intentions.  
In terms of control variables, the full model reported in Table A1 in the appendix shows that 
not only the entrepreneurial status of a student’s parents, but also the entrepreneurial status of his 
or her peers’ parents are significantly positively associated with the student’s own 
entrepreneurial intentions. The science test score of a student is significantly negatively 
associated with the student’s entrepreneurial intentions. Educational spending per student in the 
school system is weakly negatively associated with students’ entrepreneurial intentions, and the 
country’s GDP per capita positively.  
4.3  Private Operation or School Competition? Some Evidence on Possible Mechanisms 
The presented estimates of the effect of private-school shares on students’ entrepreneurial 
intentions are reduced-form estimates. They raise the question about the underlying mechanisms 
and channels through which the effect comes about. Is it that privately operated schools are just 
better in teaching entrepreneurship? Or is it the competition that larger private-school shares 
create among schools which is responsible for the positive effect? It is hard to devise 
identification strategies that are able to convincingly discriminate between the different 
mechanisms, and we cannot provide conclusive answers in our framework. However, in this 
section, we report two kinds of indicative analyses that shed some light on these questions.  
In the first analysis, reported in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4, we measure private 
schooling not as the average at the country level, but directly at the level of individual schools. 
Lacking an instrument for private schooling at the school level, such a specification does not 
necessarily identify the causal effect of private school operation because of possible non-random 
sorting of students between types of schools. Still, the difference in results to the same model 
when measuring private schooling at the country level (columns (3) and (6) of Table 2) is 
striking. The size of the coefficient is only about a quarter when measured at the school rather   19
than the country level. Note that standard expectations of bias in the school-level estimate would 
suggest that it is upwardly biased, because private schools might be able to “cream skim” among 
the student population. In addition, when entering the school-level and the country-level private-
school measures jointly in columns (2) and (4), the school-level measure does not add 
significantly positively to the model, and the whole effect is captured by the country-level share 
of private schools. This pattern of results is indicative of the interpretation that most of the effect 
of private-school shares does not originate in private schools themselves being inherently more 
effective in fostering entrepreneurial intentions.  
This conclusion is corroborated by the second additional analysis. In columns (5) and (6) of 
Table 4, we exclude all students attending privately operated schools from the sample, so that in 
each country, only the students attending public schools are considered. Again, non-random 
selection between public and private schools in a country would bias the estimate in such a 
model, and the usual expectation would be a downward bias. But the estimates suggest that 
students in public schools benefit as much from larger shares of privately operated schools as 
suggested by the average effects reported in Table 3. 
These results are in line with an interpretation that attributes the majority of the estimated 
effect of private-school shares to changes in the competitive climate in a school system, rather 
than any advantage of private schools in the effectiveness of their operation. It seems that the 
prime importance of a larger public-school sector for students’ entrepreneurial intentions is that 
all schools, public as well as private, are exposed to higher intensities of competition.  
Finally, it is worth noting that among the indicators of learning time provided to students in 
different subjects, contained in our set of control variables, only the residual “other” category is 
significantly positively associated with entrepreneurial intentions, whereas learning time in the 
traditional subjects – mathematics, science, and reading – enters negatively (see Table A1 in the 
appendix). This pattern of results is consistent with Lazear’s (2004) ‘jack-of-all-trades’ view of 
entrepreneurs which argues that a more varied curriculum and a more general skill portfolio are 
supportive of entrepreneurship.    
Table 4: School-Level Private Operation, System-Level Competition, and Public-School Students’ Outcomes 
Measuring private operation at the school level   Restricting sample to students 
in public schools only  






  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 










































































Observations  (students)  184,583 184,583 170,605 170,605  150,715  140,660 
Clustering  units  (countries)  26 26 23 23  26  23 
R²  (second  stage)  0.019 0.018 0.021 0.021  0.016  0.019 
R²  (first  stage)   0.651  0.738  0.593  0.708 
F-statistic of excluded instrument    25.70    19.18  24.05  28.30 
Dependent variable: student’s intention to become entrepreneur. Columns (1) and (3): Least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability. 
Columns (2) and (4)-(6): Two-stage least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability, using the share of Catholics in the population in 1900 
interacted with an indicator of whether Catholicism was the state religion as an instrument for the private school share. All regressions include control variables 
for student’s academic achievement (2), individual and family background (5), school location (4), socio-economic composition of the school (5), learning time 
(4), and country-level controls (4) as set out in Table A1, imputation dummies, and interaction terms between imputation dummies and the variables. Country 
sample: OECD countries (except for Australia, Austria, France, and Switzerland due to missing data). “Predominantly Christian countries” refers to countries 
with a share of adherence to Christian denominations of more than 85 percent in 1900 (which excludes Japan, Korea, and Turkey). Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses. Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.   21
4.4 Robustness  Analyses 
To ensure that our results are not driven by non-Christian countries, columns (4)-(6) of 
Table 3 perform the analyses on the sub-sample of countries whose population is primarily 
Christian. The previous estimates based on the full OECD sample are qualitatively unaffected 
when countries with low shares of Christians (Japan, Korea, and Turkey) are dropped from the 
sample.  
Table 5 shows that the basic result is robust in several sub-samples of countries and to 
including regional fixed effects. The first column excludes countries that had Catholicism as a 
state religion. Results are confirmed, although the point estimate declines somewhat. Column (2) 
disregards countries whose GDP per capita is below 9,000 USD (Mexico and Turkey), indicating 
that their level of economic development differs markedly from the other OECD countries. 
Again, results are confirmed.  
In column (3), we add controls for four world regions – Europe, North America, East Asia, 
and Oceania – to ensure that results do not just capture variation across regions that may have 
differing cultures and geographies. Results are hardly affected by adding these region fixed 
effects. Finally, column (4) restricts the analysis to European countries only, again confirming 
the main result.  
In addition, to ensure that our results are not driven by individual countries, we performed 
the regressions dropping each individual country from the analysis one at a time. Results are 
fully robust in these regressions.  
The fact that our models include the entrepreneurial status of the occupation of the parents 
of both the students and their peers among the control variables already indicates that our results 
capture effects of the current school system on the students, rather than only long-established 
differences in entrepreneurship across countries. In additional robustness specifications, we also 
added country-level measures of self-employment and entrepreneurship as additional control 
variables, which did not affect our results.
8  
                                                 
8 Self-employment rates are available from the OECD Factbook. Prevalence rates of entrepreneurial activity as 
well as a categorization of entrepreneurial activity between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship are available 
from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). Self-employment rates and opportunity entrepreneurship are 
negatively and prevalence of entrepreneurial activity is positively associated with students’ entrepreneurial 
intentions. However, including these country-level control variables does not affect our results on the impact of 
private school competition. Detailed results are available from the authors on request.   
Table 5: Robustness to Sub-Samples of Countries and Regional Fixed Effects 
Sample of countries: No Catholic 
state religion 
GDP per capita 
> 9,000 USD 
OECD with 
region dummies  Europe only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Second stage results (Dependent variable: student’s intention to become entrepreneur):   














































First stage results (Dependent variable: private school share):   
















































Observations  (students)  143,228 158,260 188,075 117,722 
Clustering  units  (countries)  22 24 26 19 
F-statistic  of  excluded  instrument  33.08 49.51 55.61 49.29 
R²  (first  stage)  0.640 0.657 0.751  0.8783 
R²  (second  stage)  0.002 0.019 0.020 0.024 
Two-stage least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability. All regressions include 24 additional background control variables as set out in 
Table A1, imputation dummies, and interaction terms between imputation dummies and the variables. Country sample: OECD countries (except for Austria, 
Australia, France, and Switzerland due to missing data). Column (1) excludes Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain. Column (2) excludes Mexico and Turkey. 
Column (3) includes region dummies for Europe, East Asia, North America, and Oceania. “Catholic share in 1900 (no state religion)” refers to the share of 
Catholics in the population in 1900 interacted with an indicator of whether Catholicism was the state religion. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at 
the country level in parentheses. Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.    23
5. Conclusions 
Given the important role attributed to entrepreneurs in the long-run growth of economies in 
a dynamic world, policymakers wonder whether entrepreneurial traits are amenable to fostering 
in the education system. Our results suggest that this is indeed the case: We find a statistically 
and quantitatively significant effect of the extent of competition from privately operated schools 
on the intentions of students towards the end of compulsory school to become entrepreneurs.  
Our identification rests on cross-country variation in the size of the private-school sector that 
can be attributed to international differences in the share of Catholics in the population at the end 
of the 19
th century. Because Catholic doctrine was strongly opposed to the secular state school 
systems emerging at the time, countries with larger Catholic populations (but without a Catholic 
state religion) created sizable non-governmental school systems that persist to these days. By 
drawing on this historical source of variation, we avoid endogeneity biases that may otherwise 
plague school-choice research. The fact, documented in the literature and apparent in our data, 
that Catholics in general show lower entrepreneurial aspirations attenuates concerns that our 
identification draws on variation related to features that are otherwise conducive to 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the use of long-standing and large-scale differences in school 
competition, drawing on variation between countries from zero to two-thirds privately operated 
schools, allows us to capture the type of general-equilibrium effects that standard economic 
thinking has in mind when discussing effects of competition.  
Our instrumental-variable results suggest that an increase in a country’s share of students 
attending private schools by 10 percentage points raises a student’s likelihood of having 
entrepreneurial intentions by at least 0.3 percentage points, or 11 percent of the international 
mean of students with entrepreneurial intentions. This result is robust to including the parents’ 
occupational status, peers’ parents’ occupational status, students’ academic test scores, the 
Catholic share in 2000, government funding in private schools, and a large set of additional 
control variables at the student, school, and country level. The result is also confirmed across 
various country sub-samples, providing confidence in a causal interpretation of our results. We 
also provide indicative evidence suggesting that the effect is mostly due to general-equilibrium 
effects of school competition, rather than due to more effective operation of private schools.    24
Our results suggest that school competition might not only have an impact on students’ 
cognitive skills measured by test scores, but might also exert important effects beyond traditional 
cognitive skills. Students’ intentions to become an entrepreneur are amenable to institutional 
features of the school system. Competition from private schools seems to create a climate in the 
overall school system that is supportive of entrepreneurial intentions. Given that the existing 
literature suggests that explicit programs of entrepreneurship education may not be able to raise 
entrepreneurial intentions significantly, this result has important implications for the future 
direction of discussions about how education systems can promote entrepreneurship.  
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736. Table A1: International Descriptive Statistics and Control-Variable Results of Main Model 
 Descriptive  Statistics  Main  Model 
First stage 
(dep. var.: private 
school share) 
Second stage 
(dep. var.: student’s 
entrepreneurial intention)
 
Mean Std.  dev. 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Student’s intention to become entrepreneur  0.028  0.163         
Private school share  0.179  0.202      0.066
***  (0.012) 
Catholic share in 1900 (no state religion)  0.271  0.357  0.283
***  (0.049)     
Parents entrepreneur  0.111  0.312  0.014
***  (0.001)  0.043
***  (0.003) 
Catholic share in 2000  0.408  0.366  0.207
***  (0.008)  -0.020
***  (0.006) 
Government funding share in private schools  0.550  0.345  0.215
***  (0.005)  -0.010
***  (0.003) 
Student’s academic achievement         
Mathematics test score  500.009  94.706  0.0003
***  (0.00002) -0.00002  (0.00001) 
Science test score  504.070  97.235  -0.0001
***  (0.00002) -0.00003
***  (0.00001) 
Individual and family background variables         
Female 0.511  0.500  0.006
***  (0.002)  -0.014
***  (0.001) 
First generation immigrant  0.036  0.188  -0.004  (0.003)  0.008
**  (0.003) 
Second generation immigrant  0.040  0.199  -0.007
***  (0.002)  0.008
***  (0.003) 
PISA index of family wealth  0.003  1.010  -0.0004
*  0.0002)  0.006
***  (0.0007) 
Years of schooling of parents   13.051  3.266  -0.0009
***  (0.0001)  -0.0003
*  (0.0002) 
School location         
Small town (3,000-15,000 people)   0.216  0.414  0.028
***  (0.006)  0.005
**  (0.002) 
Town (15,000-100,000 people)   0.342  0.473  0.066
***  (0.006)  0.009
***  (0.002) 
City (100,000-1,000 000 people)   0.212  0.408  0.093
***  (0.007)  0.003  (0.002) 
Large city (over 1,000,000 people)  0.108  0.313  0.131
***  (0.008)  0.0003  (0.003) 
(continued on next page)  
Table A1 (continued) 
 Descriptive  Statistics  Main  Model 
First stage  Second stage   
Mean Std.  dev. 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Socio-economic composition of school         
Share of peers with entrepreneurial parents  0.111  0.101  0.313
***  (0.016)  0.065
***  (0.009) 
Share of immigrant students  0.076  0.147  -0.147
***  (0.015)  0.022
***  (0.006) 
School average parental education  12.848  2.025  0.006
***  (0.001)  -0.001
**  (0.0006) 
School average index of home possessions  0.005  0.594  -0.200
***  (0.008)  0.011
**  (0.006) 
School average index of family wealth  0.003  0.697  0.185
***  (0.007)  -0.010
**  (0.004) 
Learning time in regular lessons         
Mathematics 3.843  1.704  0.00001  (0.0006)  -0.001
***  (0.0004) 
Science 3.055  1.963  -0.004
***  (0.0004)  -0.002
***  (0.0003) 
Reading 3.826  1.724  0.003
***  (0.0005)  -0.0004  (0.0004) 
Other 4.075  2.180  -0.004
***  (0.0003)  0.002
***  (0.0003) 
Country-level control variables         
Contemporary GDP per capita (1,000 $)  22.424 9.127  -0.007
***  (0.0005)  0.0006
***  (0.0002) 
Educational expenditure per student (1,000 $)  54.700 25.672  0.001
***  (0.0002)  -0.0002
*  (0.00008) 
External exit exams  0.693  0.448  0.063
***  (0.004)  -0.002  (0.002) 
Communist background  0.162  0.354  -0.368
***  (0.006)  0.037
***  (0.005) 
Observations (students)      188,075    188,075   
Clustering units (countries)      26    26   
R²       0.593    0.018   
Descriptive statistics: Mean: international mean (weighted by sampling probabilities). Std. dev.: international standard deviation.  
Main model: Full results of the specification reported in column (3) of Table 3. Two-stage least squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability. 
Regression includes imputation dummies and interaction terms between imputation dummies and the variables. Country sample: OECD countries (except for 
Australia, Austria, France, and Switzerland due to missing data). “Catholic share in 1900 (no state religion)” refers to the share of Catholics in the population in 
1900 interacted with an indicator of whether Catholicism was the state religion. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses. 
Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent. CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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